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Most recently, feminist philosophers and biologists have been trying to review the notion of "biological sex." American philosopher Judith Butler is one of the former. One can summarize her conclusions by her famous argument that the body positioned as prior to the sign is always "posited" or "signified" as "prior" and "precedes" its own action. If this is so, then there should not be a mimetic or representational status of language or signs that follow bodies--as the body is only signified as prior to signification.1 The positing process also constitutes and conditions the "materiality" of the body. She states that what enables this positing is a problematic gendered matrix that ontologizes and fixes the "irreducible" materiality into a bunch of taken-for-granted discourses on sex and sexuality.2

Irigaray echoes Butler by saying that within the masculine-female (form-matter or mind-body) binary, the “female” is not an intelligible term, it is articulated through a further materiality acting as the impossible necessity that enables any ontology.3 Aside from philosophy, the binding, forming, and deforming of gendered bodies through social prohibitions and the so-called cultural intelligibility criteria of sex also constitute and regulate the fields of bodies. Butler’s famous works include Gender Trouble (1990), Bodies That Matter (1993) and The Psychic Life of Power (1997) etc.

Butler reflects on Simone de Beauvoir’s famous postulation that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman”. Butler regards this statement as receiving wisdom yet apparently still implies that biological sex is an immutable essence. It is not according to Butler’s premise that gender is unnatural or a cultural construction (see Butler’s “Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex,” 1986). In an article published in 1987 entitled “Variations on Sex and Gender,” Butler presented her reading of Beauvoir through Monique Wittig and Michel Foucault, in which Butler provides what she calls “a schematic outline of a theory of gender invention”.4 Throughout the article she is careful to emphasize that to talk in terms of gender’s “inventiveness” is not to imply that it is a radical act of creation. Rather, gender is “an originating activity incessantly taking place”. It is a construct, a process, a project occurring in a culture where it is impossible to be “without” (i.e. lacking or outside) gender.5
A common mistaken view is that de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is simply an application of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness to woman’s specific situation. Yet though not necessary, an understanding of Sartre may in a lot of ways enrich our appreciation of Beauvoir as an original thinker.6 Beauvoir said that consciousness exists one’s body, which, in the context of culture, involves the “becoming” of one’s gender.7
The followings are some of Butler’s readings:8
1) For Beauvoir, to become a woman is a purposive and appropriative set of acts, the gradual acquisition of a skill, and a “project” in Sartre terms, to assume a culturally established corporeal style and significance. Butler’s question is: when “become” is taken to mean “purpose-fully assume or embody,” Beauvoir’s declaration seems to shoulder the burden of Sartrian choice. For if genders are in some sense chosen, then what happens to the ways in which we are, as it were, already culturally interpreted? How can gender be both a matter of choice and cultural construction?
2) Beauvoir’s formulation of gender as a project in The Second Sex seems to invite speculation. Butler suggests a theory of gender that tries to make cultural sense of the existential doctrine of choice. “Choice” in this context comes to signify a corporeal process of interpretation within a network of deeply entrenched cultural norms, i.e. it does not come from a sense of “Nothingness”. When the body is conceived as a cultural locus of gender meanings, it becomes unclear what aspects of this body are natural or free of cultural imprint. Indeed, according to Butler, it will be unable to find a body that preexists its cultural interpretation, and gender is the acculturation of the corporeal.
3) Butler’s questions are: If gender is determined in the dialect between culture and choice, then what role does “sex” serve? Ought we conclude that the very distinction between sex and gender is anachronistic? Has Beauvoir refuted the original meaning of her famous formulation, or was that declaration more nuanced than we originally guessed? 
Butler suggests that to answer the above questions, we must reconstruct Beauvoir’s distinction between sex and gender. It is this suggestion that composes the main ideas of this paper when it comes to the part of influences that Jean Paul Sartre has on Beauvoir.
Sartrian Bodies and Cartesian Ghosts
Butler questions the existential choice implied in the thoughts of Sartre and Beauvoir when they are applied to gender. She said the notion that we somehow choose our genders poses an ontological puzzle, for it might at first seem impossible that we can occupy a position outside the gender in order to stand back and choose our genders. She said: If we are always already gendered, immersed in gender, what sense does it make to say that we choose what we already are? 9 Not only does the thesis appear tautological, but it also postulates a choosing self prior to its own chosen gender, and adopting a Cartesian view of the self, an egological structure that lives and thrives prior to language and cultural life. Butler said:10 
It is said that whether consciousness has any discrete ontological status apart from the body is a question that Sartre answers inconsistently throughout Being and Nothingness. In Butler’s reading, this ambivalence toward a Cartesian mind/body dualism reemerges, although less seriously, in Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. Her readings include these points:11
1) In The Second Sex one can see an effort to radicalize the implication of Sartre’s theory concerned with establishing an embodied notion of freedom. The chapter on “The Body” in Being and Nothingness contains the echoes of Cartesianism which haunt Sartre’s thinking, but also gives evidence of his own efforts to expel the Cartesian ghost. 
2) Although Sartre argues that the body is coextensive with personal identity (it is a “perspective” that one lives), he also suggests that consciousness is in some sense beyond the body, as interestingly describes in the chapter “The Body” in Being and Nothingness, which said:12 
“The body…. is the immediate presence to the For-itself of “sensible” things…, a centre of reference and is already surpassed either toward the appearance of a new this … in each perception the body is there; it is the immediate Past in so far as it still touches on the Present which flees it. This means that it is at once a point of view and a point of departure… which I am and which at the same time I surpass toward what I have to be.”
In Butler’s reading, Sartre, instead of refuting Cartesianism, assimilates the Cartesian moment as an immanent and partial feature of consciousness. Sartre’s theory seeks to conceptualize the disembodied or transcendent feature of personal identity as paradoxical, yet essentially, related to consciousness as embodied. 
3) According to Sartre, the duality of consciousness as both embodied and transcendent is intrinsic to personal identity, and the effort to locate personal identity exclusively in one or the other is a project in bad faith.
One can get the above observations from the section “The Body as Being-for-itself: Facticity” in Being and Nothingness, in which Sartre has given a detailed account:13 
“‘The soul is easier to know than the body,’ said Descartes. Thereby he intended to make a radical distinction between the facts of thought, which are accessible to reflection, and the facts of the body, the knowledge of which must be guaranteed by divine Providence… But a situation is not a pure contingent given… the body-for-itself is never a given which I can know. It is there everywhere as the surpassed; it exists only in so far as I escape it by nihilating myself… It is the in-itself which is surpassed by the nihilating for-itself and which reapprehends the for-itself in this very surpassing…In one sense therefore the body is a necessary characteristic of the for-itself;…the very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body; that is, that its nihilating escape from being should be made in the form of an engagement in the world.”
Butler emphasizes that although Sartre’s references to “surpassing” the body may be read as presupposing a mind/body dualism, one needs to understand this self-transcendence as a corporeal movement, and thus rethinks both our usual ideas of “transcendence” and of the mind/body dualism itself. In her reading of Sartre, one may surpass the body, but this does not mean that one definitively gets beyond the body. It is because the body is not static, but a mode of intentionality, a directional force and mode of desire. She said:14 
“As a condition of access to the world, the body is a being comported beyond itself, referring to the world and thereby revealing its own ontological status as a referential reality. For Sartre, the body is lived and experienced as the context and medium for all human strivings. Because for Sartre all human beings strive after possibilities not yet realized, human beings are to that extent “beyond” themselves.”
This condition is itself a corporeal experience and the body is experienced as a mode of becoming. In Sartre’s own words as stated in Being and Nothingness: 15 
“We can never apprehend this to be is to choose ourselves… this inapprehensive body is precisely the necessity that there be a choice, that I do not exist all at once.”
Butler stresses that though we “become” our genders in Beauvoir’s view, gender is not traceable to a definable origin because it itself is an originating activity incessantly taking place. Her reading of Sartre has lead to the emphasis that gender is always a contemporary way of organizing past and future cultural norms. Gender, as a way of situating oneself in and through those norms, is an active style of living one’ body in the world.16 
Gender as Choice and the Body as Situation
So is gender a choice? In Butler’s views, yes, one chooses gender, but one does not choose it from an ontological juncture between the choosing agent and the chosen gender, for according to her, the Cartesian space of the deliberate “chooser” is fictional. She relates Beauvoir’s view of gender to Sartre’s notion of prereflective choice and gives it a concrete cultural meaning. Prereflective choice is spontaneous act with Sartre terms “quasi-knowledge.” It is not wholly conscious, but the kind of choice we make and only later realize that we have made.
Beauvoir seems to refer this notion of choice to a “taking on” act through which gender is assumed. It is a subtle and strategic project, for becoming a gender is a mindful process in a cultural reality laden with sanction, taboos, and prescriptions. Butler elaborated that this is a choice to assume a certain kind of body, to live or wear one’s body in a certain way in a world of already established corporeal styles.17  This reminds us of her famous gender performance theory. It is admitted that it is a painful process when it comes the moments of gender dislocation. Butler said if human existence is always gendered existence, then to stray outside of established gender is in some sense to put one’s very existence into question. We would have to confront the burden of choice intrinsic to living as a man or a woman or some other gender identities, and this is a freedom made burdensome through social constraints.18 
But there are more meanings that Butler has disclosed in Beauvoir’s work, which counter-balance Sartre’s ambivalence and argue the limits of a Cartesian version of disembodied freedom.19 
1) In The Second Sex, Beauvoir has pointed out the cultural situation in which men have traditionally been associated with the disembodied or transcendent feature of human existence and women with the bodily and immanent feature of human existence. By defining women as “Other,” men are able to make themselves other than their bodies, which is a symbol potentially of human decay and transience and of a limitation in general. The masculine “I” is thus a non-corporeal soul. Yet the pursuit of disembodiment is necessarily deceived because the body can never really be denied. Butler regards Beauvoir’s own view of an embodied identity that “incorporates” transcendence subscribes to neither position.20 
One would agree with Butler when reading paragraphs by Beauvoir like the following in The Second Sex:21
“Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, …He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it.”
2) Beauvoir suggests an alternative to the gender polarity of masculine disembodiment and feminine enslavement to the body in her notion of the body as a “situation.” The body as situation has at least a twofold meaning: i) as a locus of cultural interpretations, the body is a material reality that has already been located and defined within a social context; ii) the body is also the situation of having to take up and interpret or reinterpret that set of received interpretations. This is so called “existing” one’s body, which process becomes a very concrete way of politicizing personal life. Beauvoir said:22 
“When an individual is kept in a situation of inferiority, the fact is that he is inferior. But the significance of the verb to be must be rightly understood here; it is in bad faith to give it a static value when it really has the dynamic Hegelian sense of “to have become.”
Now no wonder why Butler, based on her famous critique of the dichotomy of the notions of “sex” and “gender,” said that if we accept the body as a cultural situation, then the notion of a natural body and a natural “sex” would seem increasingly suspect.   And if one’s body is a situation and a field of cultural possibilities both received and reinterpreted, then both gender and sex seems to be thoroughly cultural affairs. Beauvoir’s own words should explain better her notion of “one becomes a woman”:23 
“the body of woman is one of the essential elements in her situation in the world. But that body is not enough to define her as woman; there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities and in the bosom of society.”
Butler adds the note that woman exists on the metaphysical order of being is not something already accomplished, self-identical, static, but someone on the metaphysical order of becoming who invents possibility into her experience, including the possibility of never becoming a substantive, self-identical “woman.”24 
Sartre’s Pitfalls?
The Cartesian ghosts in Sartrian bodies may be further explored in the famous Sartrian notions of “Being-for-Itself” (pour-soi) and “Being-in-Itself” (en-soi). The common reading is that “Being-in-Itself” refers to the constant, material existence that humans share with the animals, vegetables, and minerals, whereas Being-for-Itself refers to the moving, conscious existence that human share only with other humans.25 
It is said that the distinction between Being-in-Itself and Being-for-Itself is useful in an analysis of the human person, particularly if we associate Being-in-Itself with the body. The body has constant and objective being, because it can be seen, touched, heard, smelled, and/or tasted, the body is the perceived. In contrast, the perceiver – the entity that does the seeing, touching, hearing, smelling, and/or tasting – is not itself perceptible object but, according to Sartre, still has a certain kind of Being, which is what he means by Being-for-Itself. According to Sartre, what separates one’s “I” – one’s consciousness or one’s mind – from one’s body is paradoxically, nothing (literally no-thing, or nothingness). 
In fact, both Sartre and Beauvoir have explicated the concept of existing one’s body. When Beauvoir pays more attention on how woman exists her body through various social and cultural situations, Sartre is more interested in the relation of consciousness to the body as an existential relation. In his own words:26
“First of all, it is evident that consciousness can exist its body only as consciousness. Therefore my body is a conscious structure of my consciousness…(body) as being something which consciousness is without having to be it and which it passes over in order to be what it has to be. In short, consciousness (of) the body is lateral and retrospective; the body is the neglected, the ‘passed by in silence’.” 
Here are some common understandings of Sartre’s statement “Existence precedes Essence”:27
1) that we exist only as amorphous, living organisms until we create identities for ourselves through conscious action as making choices, coming to decisions, reaffirming old purposes and projects, or affirming new ones.
2) that because nothing compels us to act in any one way, we are absolutely free. Our futures are totally open; none of the blanks has been filled in for us. But as we start filling in these blanks, when we elect one possibility for ourselves, we simultaneously annihilate all the others.
3) Beings-for-themselves are without essence or definition. We must define ourselves through the mutually related processes of decision making and action-taking.  
Under Sartre’s sense of Being-for-Itself, Beauvoir reflects the social roles of women as the wife, the mother, the career woman, the prostitute, the narcissist, and the mystic. She comes to the conclusion that the tragedy of these roles is that they are not fundamentally of woman’s own making but has been constructed by man, his structure and institutions. Yet like man, a woman has no essence, or no essence of the so called eternal femininity, she needs not continue to be what others have made her to be. Here are Beauvoir’s own words:28 
“What is certain is that hitherto woman’s possibilities have been suppressed and lost to humanity, and that it is high time she be permitted to take her chances in her own interest and in the interest of all.
But paradoxically, if there are any pitfalls in the Sartrian Bodies and the Cartesian ghosts to the reflection of the gender of woman, one may think of the critique of how Beauvoir treated the female body in particular. It is said that in The Second Sex, woman’s body often appears negative: unfortunate, insignificant, dirty, shameful, burdensome, inherently alienating. It is suggested that Beauvoir’s profound distrust of the body was rooted in an existentialist distress about the carnality and mortality of the flesh and in a feminist concern about the way in which the female body imposes special burdens upon woman. As de Beauvoir saw it, a woman’s individuality, or personhood, is won at the cost of rejecting her productive capacities.29 
One critique regards the body as a problem within the existentialist framework insofar as it is a stubborn and unavoidable object limiting the freedom of each conscious subject, and one may check the Cartesian ghosts of the mind and body duality implied in the context.30 
There is a saying that nevertheless, despite Beauvoir’s suspicion of the body and her valorization of the mind, her mind-body dualism was never so thorough as that of Sartre. And certainly that her attitude toward the emotions commonly associated with the body was never as negative as his. As a matter of fact, here is the record that   Beauvoir did caution Sartre that his attitude toward the body and the emotions was too inflexible. She said:31 
“I criticized Sartre for regarding his body as a mere bundle of striated muscles, and for having cut it out of his emotional world. If you gave way to tears or nerves or seasickness, he said, you were simply being weak. I, on the other hand, claimed that stomach and tear ducts, indeed the head itself, were all subject to irresistible forces on occasion.”
To go back from here to Butler’s reading, it is hard to distinguish the so called a biological fact and a social fact. A woman’s body is always imbedded with an expected mode of existence for her; but within the limits that constrain any human person, each and every woman can still shape her own existence out of the notion of Nothingness. It is clear that Beauvoir recognizes the legal, political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances that restrain woman, and she also recognizes the ways in which woman has let herself be restrained and constrained by these circumstances.32 Here comes another notion of Sartre, the mode of bad faith when we pretend that we are thing-like, that we are just a body or another object in the world that has nothing to do with our choice.
One should note that Sartre did argue that a subject must perceive from a particular embodied perspective. However, Sartre’s subject admitted his dependence on a body only to reassert his independence. The body may thirst or hunger; it may position the subject in a particular family, class or culture but these are only ‘givens’ for the ‘surpass’.33 The social and cultural compositions of a being including gender, belong to the problem of the Others in Sartre’s theories. In the attempt to avoid the solipsism that inevitably results when these inferences fail, the Other is posited as a ‘surging up’ that suddenly confronts the subject working her own projects on the physical world. This is described as a “primal Sartrean moment” which replays in the expectation and the dimensions of gender.34
Being-for –Others and The problem of Gender 
It is said that of all Sartre’s categories, Being-for-Others is probably the most suited for a feminist analysis. According to Sartre, human relations are variations on two basic themes of conflicts between rival consciousnesses – between self and Others.
It is in Sartre’s description of this confrontation between compating consciousnesses that Beauvoir found an explanation for the persistent inequality in relations between men and women. While some said that the sadist asserts himself as subject and the masochist submits to the other subject, Others are still necessary for a Sartrean subject. As Sartre has clearly explained that it is only by way of Others’ view of me that I can know who I am, and only from them that I can get an external view of myself. As stated in the section “The Body-for-Others” in Being and Nothingness:35
“Thus the Other’s very existence as the Other-for-me implies that he is revealed as a tool possessing the property of knowing and that this property of knowing is bound to some objective existence. This is what we shall call the necessity for the Other to be contingent for me.”
Yet Sartre also stated that the Other’s appearance is the revelation of the taste of his being as an immediate existence, but “I” do not grasp this taste as he does. Not only that, there is also what Sartre called “the third ontological dimension of the body,” which he describes as follows:36 
“My body is utilized and known by the Other: this is its second dimension. But in so far as I am for others, the Other is revealed to me as the subject for whom I am an object…This is the third ontological dimension of my body…it follows that even in reflection I assume the Other’s point of view on my body.”
While Beauvoir accepts Sartre’s account of the relations between consciousnesses, she argues that it is the woman who surrenders to the man and agrees to carry out his projects instead of her own, and who makes herself an object so as to comfort the masculine subject who needs her reflection of himself but is terrified of her independence.37  No wonder there comes a saying that in Sartre’s account of “Being-for-Others” in Being and Nothingness, sexual difference is confrontational not only because there is another subjectivity involved, but because what is in question is the very part of oneself that is a thing.38 
One can read Sartre’s idea as that whenever the independent existence of Others is admitted, the autonomy of the subject is immediately threatened, and sexuality may bring out the intensity of the problem of Being-for –Others. As Andrea Nye analyzes, this admission makes incoherent the existentialist prescription to assert ourselves and live authentically, for if our very identity is constructed by Others, it is not clear how we can have such a freedom or take on such a responsibility, and the subjectivity project will be an illusion of autonomy, which is an illusion initiated by Descartes.39  
Embodiment and Autonomy
For a long time, Butler has argued that gender may be “chosen” only from within the parameters of culturally available terms which always preexist the subject. She suggests that tracing the history of gender may reveal its gradual release from the binary gender restrictions. It is obvious that psychoanalytic, Foucauldian, and Marxist insights continue to support her theories of gender, sex, and performativity (that gender is performance).
As we have pointed out, it is Beauvoir’s verb “become” in her famous statement “one becomes a woman” that has disturbed Butler, who argues that the verb contains a consequential ambiguity. In her introduction to The Second Sex, Beauvoir explicitly positions herself not as a woman or as a feminist, but as an existentialist who stresses on choice and freedom. If one can be free to choose one’s gender, and if freedom has any meaning, it is in taking responsibility for one’s actions, in realizing that there is always room for some sort of choice, no matter how constricted one’s circumstances. In this sense, Butler insists that inventiveness or innovation is more effective than the transcendence of sex and gender. 40 
It is understood that the only substance of the Sartrean consciousness is ‘negation,’ and Sartre in his overcoming of the duality of non-communicating physical and mental substances, revealing subjectivity as an act of pure will or choice. At some points the world consists of only ‘me’ and ‘what is not me’. As he said: 41
“This is nothingness is not anything accept human reality apprehending itself as excluded from being and perpetually beyond being, in common with nothing.”
One way of overcoming the Cartesian mind/body dualism is to argue that sex is already gender, as both Butler and Beauvoir do, since the body/mind spilt no longer makes sense if you claim that gender is a way of “doing” the body. Butler claims that sex is always already gender: the body does not “cause” gender, but it is an effect of genders which constrain that taking up or “choice.” Yes, we “become” our genders, but there is no place outside gender which precedes this becoming.42
Butler’s comment is that Beauvoir does not so much refute Sartre as take him at his non-Cartesian best. Butler has a point when one reads Sartre’s saying in Being and Nothingness: 43
“the body cannot be for me transcendent and known; the spontaneous, unreflective consciousness is no longer the consciousness of the body. It would be best to say “exist” as a transitive verb, that consciousness exists its body… and the relation of consciousness to the body is an existential relation.” 
Butler argues that the tension in Beauvoir’s theory lies in the move from the natural to the acculturate body. She said one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman does not imply that this “becoming” traverses a path from disembodied freedom to cultural embodiment. In Butler’s words: 44
“The movement from sex to gender is internal to embodied life, a sculpting of the original body into a cultural from. To mix Sartrian phraseology with Beauvoir’s, we might say that to “exist” one’s body in culturally concrete terms means, at least partially, to become one’s gender.”
The related choice in the becoming is not an easy one, as Butler stated clearly, that: 45
“I not only choose my gender, and not only choose it within culturally available terms, but on the street and in the world I am always constantly constituted by others, so that my self- styled gender may well find itself in comic or even tragic opposition to the gender that others see me through or with.”
A concluded reading is this: when Beauvoir asked woman to transcend the limits of her immanence, she was not asking woman to negate herself but rather to cast off those weights that are impeding her progress toward authentic selfhood. Some of these weights may be too heavy for any individual to cast off; but others can be disposed of through small and large acts of empowerment. What is now does not always have to be. No one or no thing can hold women back forever. 46

Endnotes
1 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter, (New York, N.Y. & London, U.K.: Routledge, 1993), 30.
2  Ibid., 29.
3  Ibid., 39. 
4  Judith Butler, “Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, Foucault (1987)” in Sara Smith & 
  Judith Butler (ed). A Judith Butler Reader, (Oxford (U.K.): Blackwell, 2004), 21. 
5  Ibid.
6  Rosemaire Tong, A Comprehensive Introduction: Femnist Thought, (Colorado: Westview Press,   
  1989), 196.
7  See 4, 21.
8  Ibid., 23.
9  Ibid., 24.
10  Ibid.
11  Ibid. 24-25.  
12  Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York, N.Y.: 
   Philosophical Library, 1966), 302.
13  Sartre, 282-285.
14  See 4, 25.
15  Sartre, 329.
16  See 4, 26.
17  See 4, 26.
18  Ibid., 27.
19  Ibid., 28-29.
20  Ibid., 26-27.
21  Simone de Beauvoir, trans. & ed. by H.M. Parshley, The Second Sex, (New York, N.Y.: Bantam 
   Books, 1961), xv-xvi.
22  Ibid., xxiii.
23  Ibid., 33. 
24  See 4, 36.
25  See Tong, 196.
26  Sartre, 305.
27  Ibid.,197-8.
28  Beauvoir, 673.  
29  See Elshtain’s critique of Beauvoir’s views in The Second Sex in Tong, 212.
30  Ibid., 213.
31  Simone de Beauvoir, trans. by Peter Green, The Prime of Life, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 
   Books, 1965), 109.
32  Tong, 215.
33  See Being and Nothingness, Part IV, Chapters I, II, and “The Situation”.
34  Andrea Nye, Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man ( New York, N.Y. Routlege, 1988),104.
35  Sartre, 319.
36  Ibid., 327-331.
37  Nye, 85-86.
38  Ibid., 87.
39  Ibid., 104.
40  See 4, 22.
41  Sartre, 251.
42  See 4, 21.
43  Sartre, 305.
44  See 4, 25.
45   Ibid., 35.
46  Tong, 216.




